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analysis.   This   chapter   challenges   previous   literature   by   questioning   the   neutrality   of 







of   the utility  of  IAD in the analysis  of  OCCs, and Madison,  Frischmann, and Strandburg’s 
adaptation. Additionally, it ends by addressing the defining characteristics of digital commons. 
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of   commons   has   also   attracted   the   attention   of   researchers.   (Hess   and   Ostrom   2005) 
Constructing commons in the cultural environment as characterized by Madison, Frischmann, 
and   Strandburg   (2010)   refers   to   a   broader   set   of   commons   in   the   field   of   culture   and 
knowledge.   This   chapter   addresses   a   specific   type   of   constructed   cultural   common­pool 
resource: online creation communities.
With the adoption of information and communication technologies (ICTs), diverse types 
of   communities   of   individuals   following   common   goals   through   technologically  mediated 
communication have  emerged.  (Benkler  2006)  Online creation communities  (OCCs)  are a 
particular type of online community whose goal is knowledge­making and sharing. OCCs are 
communities of individuals that mainly interact via a platform for online participation, with 
the goal  of  building and sharing a common­pool resource (or common pool of  resources) 






1999;  Orlikowski   2002)  Unlike   other   types   of   online   communities,  OCCs  must   integrate 
individual contributions into a common pool, which can heighten interdependencies and the 
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2004;  O’Mahony  2007;  O’Mahony  and  Ferraro  2007;  Weber  2004)  and more   recently  on 
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this   regard,   the   chapter   challenges   previous   literature   by   questioning   the   neutrality   of 
infrastructure for collective action. 
Empirical analysis: Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework








digital   threads  available  at   the  OCCs  websites.   In   the   case  of  OCCs,   random selection   is 







of   the  OCCs  (e.g.,  multi­media  archives,   libraries,   encyclopedias,  dictionaries,   information 
nodes, software programs, collective social memory, among others). 
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II.  Online creation communities  viewed  through an analytical   framework directed at 
institutional analysis and development
This section views OCCs through the analytical framework of institutional analysis and 
development   (IAD).   Reference   is   made   to   the   adaptation   of   Madison,   Frischmann   and 
Strandburg (2010) of the framework to constructed commons (see figure I). First, resource 
characteristics,   community   attributes,   and   the   governance   of  OCCs   are   presented.   In   the 
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Madison,   Frischmann   and   Strandburg   provide   a   characterization   of   the   cultural 
environment as being that within which commons construction emerges. They also recognize 
that the background environment for a particular commons may need further specification and 
analysis   in   order   to   situate   the   description,   classification   and   analysis   of   resource 
characteristics, community attributes, and governance institutions. In the analysis of OCCs, a 






natural   commons­pool   resources.  Rather,   they  are   resources   that  need   to  be  built.  OCCs, 
indeed, arise from the collective goal of building a specific resource. The building process is 




goods,   they   are   non­rivalrous   and  non­excludable.  Madison,   Frischmann,   and   Strandburg 
(2010) classify constructed commons goals as existing in a milieu of Intellectual Property (IP) 
6
Fuster  Morell,  M.  Governance  of  online   creation  communities   for   the  building  of  digital   commons:  Viewed 






According   to  Madison,   Frischmann,   and   Strandburg   (2010)   cultural   commons   are 
diverse in terms of the level at which their pooled resources are most easily identifiable or  
recognized. OCCs form a case where pooled resources are easily identifiable – an archive that 
gathers   and   coherently   systematizes   the   contributions.   Indeed,   the   construction   of   an 
integrated and identifiable piece of knowledge is what distinguishes OCCs from other online 
communities   such   as   networking   sites   or   communities   of   support   or   shared   interest.   An 
encyclopedia is the main common resource in the case of Wikipedia, a picture repository in the 
case of Flickr, how to manuals in the case of Wikihow, and organizational information linked to 
a   forum  in   the  case  of  Openesf.  However,  beyond   their  principal   resources,  all   the   cases 
agglutinate   other   secondary   “pooled   resources”  which   deepen   one   another.   For   example, 
Wikipedia is not only an encyclopedia, but also hosts a repository of audio­visual sources as a 
commons. Additionally, even if the knowledge resource is the central goal around which OCCs 
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Flickr   also   draws   a   large   amount   of   participation.   In   2007,   one   estimate   put   the   Flickr 
community at 7.7 million users. (Negoescu and Gatica­Perez 2008) Wikihow has substantially 
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According   to   Preece,  Nonnecke   and  Andrews   (2004),   other   reasons  why   people   do   not 
participate in OCCs are as follows:   thinking that they were being helpful  by not posting; 
wanting   to   learn  more  about   the  community  before  diving   in;  not  being  able   to  use   the 
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male   participation   was   also   repeated   in   the   case   of  openesf.net,   where   36%   of   active 
participants are women according to their name or/and presentation in their user page. In the 
case of Wikipedia, previous research has concluded that women accounted for around 12% of 
the   editor   community.   (Glott,   Schmidt,   and  Ghosh  2009)  According   to  Wikihow  Inc,   the 
Wikihow community  has  a  higher  women’s   participation   rate  of   around  40%.   (Interview, 
Wikihow founder, 2008)  
External relationships
Madison,   Frischmann,   and   Strandburg   (2010)   suggest,  with   respect   to   community 
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The   eight   dimensions   are   interrelated   rather   than   narrowly   discrete.   Additionally, 
governance is not “static”, but dynamic and might evolve over time. It might not be linear in its 
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In   general,   the   goal   or  mission   of  OCCs   is   building   and   sharing   a   common­pool 
resource.  The specific  mission  is  defined by the early participants  or  by  the  infrastructure 





freely share in the sum of all  knowledge".  Wikihow’s mission is  "to build the world's   largest,  
highest  quality,  free how­to manual  in many languages".  Openesf.net does not have its own 
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In OCCs,  it   is   relatively   rare   for   individuals   to  be  involved  in direct  dialogues and 






diverse  code programs  can   support  a  platform of  participation.  Here  we present  a   set  of 
principles  embedded   in   the  platforms   that  embody  and  guide  participation   in  OCCs.  The 
provision of the platform is controlled by the infrastructure provider. More or less involvement 
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Openness   to   interrelation  and  participation  within   the   community   for   collaborative 
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organization of   the platform. Essentially,   this   involves  splitting content   into separate units 
(such as articles, software packages, thematic albums of pictures, etc.). The design of OCCs 








are extremely   rare.  Most  of   the  activities  of  Wikipedia  are  based on  interactions of   small 
groups. The same finding was uncovered in the Wikihow case. In openesf.net,  41.5% of the 
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during   physical   encounters.   Even   if   OCCs   are  mainly   developed   online,   participants   do 
sometimes meet physically.  In the Wikipedia and openesf.net cases, regular local meetings of 
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necessary   to   support  decentralized  decision­making   so   that  a   large  body  of  people   can   learn  
enough to participate in decisions.” (O'Mahony 2007: 148)
In the Wikipedia case the whole drafting process,  not only the resulting content,   is 
visible to all. The channels that host the interaction (such as Wikis, mailing lists, meet­ups, 
etc.)  are public  by default.  The same is   true of Wikihow. In the case of openesf.net,  each 
project creator may choose how public each project will be. They decide whether the project 
will be accessible to the general public, only to people registered at openesf.net, or only to 
members   of   that   particular   project.  However,   the  majority   of   the   projects   have   a   public  
character. The same may be said concerning Flickr, albeit at an individual level. On Flickr, each  
individual   chooses   if   their   content   is   publicly   accessible   or   not   and,   thereby,   if   the 
communication surrounding the content is public or not. 
iv)   Self­management   of   contributions:   The   autonomous   condition   of   participants   in 
contributing to the building process 
As pointed  out   in   the  previous   section,   the  design  of   the  platform of  participation 
determines, to a large degree, the type of interaction and actions that can be performed by 
participants. Still, the participants have great flexibility in terms of the types of activities they  
develop   and   degrees   of   involvement   they   undertake.  Participants   decide   their   level   of 
18
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not   driven   by   command,   but   by   self­direction.   Additionally,   participants   "build"   or   "do". 
Participation is mainly based on implementing tasks by directly creating or editing content. 
This is not a major risk. Online interaction facilitates the undoing of actions, and so mistakes 
are not  irreparable.  This  implies  that   there  is  no separation between decision­making and 
implementation, or between a delegation and an implementation body. Those who take care of  
a task also have the authority to decide about how to perform it. This form of participation 
opens up the idea of  doography  or "implementation democracy".  Finally, the coordination of 
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work   or   complex   effort   to   it.   Low   level   participants   are  people   who   contribute   only 





and   in   general   the   fact   that   a   large   percentage   of   people   do   not   contribute,   does   not 
necessarily constitute a problem or put at risk the achievement of the common goals of OCCs. v 
With exhaustible goods, such as natural resources which can be “used up” and are costly to 
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2004) They are not  only  non­rival   in  the sense that   they can tolerate  free riding without 
reducing their  stock of  value,  but  are actually  anti­rival   in  the sense that  OCCs positively 




















Finally,   it   is  also worth considering that  even  though exclusion  is  present   in OCCs, 
restricting  access   to  non­participants   can  be   costly.  Technically   this  might  be   challenging. 
Additionally,   digital   culture   values   “simple”,   “easy­to­use”   solutions.   To   incorporate   filters 
might constitute an additional step that reduces the simplicity of the system and restricts its  
21
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and   showed   that   contributions   to  Wikipedia   also   present   strong   inequalities.  Ortega   and 
Gonzalez­Barahona   (2007)   and  Ortega   (2009)   conclude   that   less   than   10%  of   the   total 
number of authors are responsible for more than 90% of the total number of contributions or,  
conversely, 90% of active editors are responsible for less than 10% of the total number of  













Shirky   reports   that   the   top   ten   participants   among   the   total   118   contributors 
contributed half of the content on an event uploaded on Flickr. (2008: 123)  The analysis of 
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‘most valuable’" ones (because they contribute more), you in effect divide the community. .  .  .  













OCCs,  particularly as   they evolve from more  initial   stages,   tend to  establish  formal 
rules. Formal rules may be restricted and limited to rules defined by the legal framework in 
which the OCCs operates (terms of use and license), or they may be more or less expansive 
including a set  of  principles  or  complex bureaucratic  policies.  However,  O'Mahony (2003) 
points   out   that   developers   in   FLOSS   resist   formal  methods.   The   existence   of   too  many 
established   rules   and   procedures   is   generally   perceived   as   problematic   in  OCCs.  Benkler 
23
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governance   and   coordination   are   non­existent   or   irrelevant   in   OCCs.   In   this   sense,   the 
governance of FLOSS projects results in a combination of formal organizational mechanisms 
and decentralized and spontaneous mechanisms for the community platform. (Lanzara and 















Wikihow follows  the same approach as  Wikipedia,  although  the  Wikihow case  sees 
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The license is a foundational rule  in OCCs in the sense that  it  defines  the resource 
management regime for the common­pool resource, the resources contributed and shared. The 
license  also  mediates   the   relationships  between  the  constructed commons  regime and  the 
intellectual   property   regimes,   where   relevant.   There   are   various   types   of   licenses   (from 
copyright,  to several  options of creative commons licenses  that are more flexible on users’ 
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researchers,   this   apparently   chaotic  diversity   becomes  a  powerful   resource   for  knowledge 
making and innovation. (Brown and Duguid 1991) The plurality of methods is also linked to 
the fact that OCCs tend to select methods according to their effectiveness in fulfilling their  





combines   this  with   a   heterogeneous,   sometimes   secondary,  mechanism   to   force   decision­
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involve, among others.  O'Mahony (2007)  and Lanzara and Morner (2003)  have researched 




concerning   infrastructure  provision   strategies   can   be  distinguished:   open  versus  closed   to 
community   involvement   in   infrastructure   provision,   and   freedom   and   autonomy  versus 
dependency on infrastructure (see figure II). 
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Freedom and autonomy  versus  dependency on the  infrastructure (net­enabler  versus  
black box) dimension (axes Y in figure II) is linked to the license held for the common­pool 
resources  and  to   the   type  of   software  used   for   the  platform of  participation.  Net­enabler 
conditions  are  defined by a  copyleft   license and  the use  of  FLOSS code,  while  black box 
conditions are defined by copyright and proprietary software. There is a qualitative difference 
28
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license   regimes  do  not.   In  other  words,   the  use  of  FLOSS and  a   copyleft   license   creates 
conditions in which the community can have greater autonomy and freedom from the platform 
provider. 














the enterprise  model   is   characterized by more  net­enabler   conditions  than  the   foundation 
model.   The   enterprise  model   applies   to   startups  which  maintain   independence   from  big 
communications companies.  It  is a strategy for developing new business models which are 
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openness   of   the   provision   body.   They   are   also   less   net­enabler   than   the   assembly   and 
enterprise models. The foundation model comprises the case of Wikipedia. O'Mahony (2007) 
researched the governance of FLOSS communities via case studies based on the autonomous 
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formal  policies   (such as   terms of  use),  and,  on  some occasions,   initiates   the  process  and 
establishes   the   mission,   and   controls   decision­making   on   conflicts   around   community 
interaction (see figure III). Still some other dimensions, like self­management of contributors 
in  self­directing   their  action   is  not   controlled  by  the   infrastructure  provider.  There   is  any 
command mechanism that force contributors or direct their actions. 















In   this   regard,   the  modality  of  governance  of   the   infrastructure  also  contributes   to 
shaping   other   dimensions   of   governance   (see   figure   IV).   Where   there   is   openness   to 
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involvement  in  infrastructure provision  is  correlated with a  community  having a decision­
making mechanism, (Fuster Morell 2010: 155) a role in conflict resolution at the community 
level, deciding its formal rules, a free license that also grants that the community owns the 
common­pool   resource,  and net­enabler  conditions  (including  the  right   to   fork).  However, 
some  of   these  aspects   (a   community  having  a  decision­making  mechanism and  a   role   in 
conflict resolution at the community level, deciding its formal rules, having a free license) are 




disempowered   in   comparison   to   the   other   cases.   In   the   corporate  model   of   Flickr,   the 
community does not have control over the design of the platform of participation, does not 


















Social norms  Community Community Community Community
Design platform 
of participation
Provider Provider Provider Provider
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In   sum,   the   level   of   control   and   power   over   governance   of   the   community   of 
participants,   in   contrast   to   the   infrastructure   provision,   are   higher   in   the   self­provision 
assembly  model   of   openesf,   followed   by   the   representative   foundation   of  Wikipedia,   the 
mission enterprise of Wikihow, and finally the corporation model of Flickr. However, in all of 
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In  terms of  outcomes of  OCCs,  we would  like   to  differentiate  between  two sets  of 










Concerning   the   two   axes   ordering   infrastructure   governance,   dependency   on 
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complex.  Openness   to   involvement   in  provision   favors   collaboration  where   there   is   some 















stable   local   common pool   resource  management,   two   refer   to   self­governance   (collective­
choice arrangements that allow most resource appropriators  to participate in the decision­
making   process   and  self­determination   of   the   community   recognized   by   higher­level 
authorities). According to the analysis of OCCs, higher self­governance favors collaboration, 
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OCCs are  a  particular   type  of  cultural  or  knowledge commons.  In  this  chapter,  we 
provided a characterization of OCCs governance as a complex system in which eight critical  
aspects   define   their   direction:  collective   mission   or   goal   of   the   process;  cultural 
principles/social norms; design of the platform of participation (where regulation is embedded 













approach  how  governance   of  OCCs  might   explain   their   ability   to   raise   participation   and 
collaboration. 
Clearly   this  was   a   very   limited   application   of   IAD,   as   action   situations  were   not  
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IAD  is   a   very  useful   framework   to  analyze  OCCs,   as   it   allows  us   to  approach  the 
interplay  between   the   characteristics   of   a   common­pool   resource,  the   characteristics   of   a 
community and the  political and institutional arrangements for its governance, and explain 
how these link to action arenas and ultimately, to outcomes. (Ostrom 2007)
In   applying   IAD,  we   build   upon   previous   adaptations.   (Madison,   Frischmann,   and 
Strandburg, 2010; Schweik and English 2012)
In line with Ostrom’s original IAD and Schweik and English’s (2012) adaptation of it to 
the   FLOSS   case,   we   consider   it   useful   to   retain   the   differentiation   between   resource 
characteristics,   community   attributes,   and   rules   of   law.   In   contrast,   it   is   stressed   less   in 
Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg (2010).  Beyond finding it useful to stress the distinction 









be   part   of   the   governance,   but   as   technological   attributes   in   their   own   right,   similar   to 
biophysical characteristics for Ostrom. In our view, rules embedded in the code govern the 
interaction as much as other rules, and need to be integrated and considered as such in the 
governance   dimension.   In   a   similar   vein,   Schweik   and   English   consider   aspects   such   as 
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would   like   to   address   the   question   of   the   conditions   that   define   the   diverse   types   of  
“commons” as “commons”. 
Natural “commons” has received substantial attention. (Ostrom 1990) OCCs are a case, 
together  with  many others,  of  other   typology  of   “commons”.   In   this   regard,  Hess   (2008) 
provided a rich classification of “new” types of “commons”. However, it remains unclear what 
“commons” have in common. In this line, Benkler (this volume) addresses this issue by raising 






a   very   valuable   contribution.   Furthermore,   it   expands   the   “commons”   to   other   central 
resources of the system. An open road should be considered a “common” because of its open 
access  character,  even  if   it   is  provided and governed by  the state.  However,   this  question 
becomes more complex when applied to other types of open access “commons”: put concretely, 
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In   the   following,   we   argue   why   we   consider   both   open   access   and   community 
governance as conditions  for a “commons”  in OCCs.   In OCCs,   the resource  is  not  already 






produces,   and   lack   control   equally   in   voluntary   and   collaborative   production   as   in   labor 




of community control  over  infrastructure is  central   for community governance as we have 
argued across this chapter.  
Furthermore,   the   idea   of   detaching   the   community   from   the   resource   might   be 
questioned.   In  OCCs   the   outcome   is   not   only   the   resources   in   terms   of   the   archive   of 
knowledge,   but   the   community   itself.   The   resource   could   not   be   produced   or   preserved 
without the community. In other words, the “production” of the community is a precondition 
for   the   possibility   to   produce   the   resource.   Particularly,   in   regards   to   the   infrastructure, 
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Wikipedia,   both  with   open   access   resources   in   different   degrees,  would   be   considered   a 
“commons”. But could OCCs produced by and/or dependent on for­profit enterprises such as 
Yahoo!   (Flickr)   and   based   on   a   non­community   self­governance  model   be   considered   a 
“commons”   just   as  Wikipedia   is   based   on   community   self­governance?   In   order   to   avoid 
misinterpretations, we are not pointing to this distinction on the basis of the Flickr corporate 
for­profit   character   and   the   Wikipedia   non­profit   character,   but   on   the   basis   of   their  
governance.  Wikihow  is  also   for  profit,  but   this   is  not   in   conflict  with  being  based  upon 
favoring community governance conditions. 
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intention, such as using the content. 
viSources: Wikihow statistics page http://www.wikihow.com/Special:Statistics Wikihow daily 
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